The Waltham Circle

The central problem in Dreier's Internalism and Speaker Relativism essay will have been addressed if we understand how the proposition "Hot dogs are good" can be false. The content of the proposition, "Hot dogs are good" has a descriptive element and a motivational element.

The motivational element determines the descriptive element. But, the statement can be cashed out in a purely descriptive proposition. When I say, "Hot dogs are good," the proposition is identical to the purely descriptive proposition, "Irami is normally motivated to eat a hot dog."

This proposition is true if I am normally motivated to eat a hot dog.
The proposition is false if I am not normally motivated to eat a hot dog.
The proposition is true if I am abnormal in that I am not motivated to eat a hot dog, but the norms related to my abnormality would have me be motivated to eat a hot dog.
The proposition is false if I am abnormal in that I am motivated to eat a hot dog, but the norms related to my abnormality would not have me be motivated to eat a hot dog.

This is the only way I can see Dreier's account working. It's the only interpretation I can think of that respects the power of the moral term to change the content of a proposition, in a way that could change the truth value in addition to being expressive of a motivation, but yet, have the proposition not be based on beliefs.